# Free Will vs. Fate



## egodeath (Oct 27, 2008)

Free Will vs. Fate

*It would seem that the laws of nature imply a set future, a sort of fate, that is predetermined. Is this idea of determinism compatible with the concept of free will and how does embracing a deterministic philosophy affect morality? Let the debate begin.

Below, a paper I wrote last year entitled "Morality Without Transcendental Freedom" or "A Critique of the  Critique of Practical Reason." Enjoy:*

In his _Critique of Practical Reason_, Immanuel Kant argues to refute David Hume?s compatibilism. Kant writes, ?The concept of causality as natural necessity?concerns only the existence of things as far as it is determinable in time?if one takes the attributes of the existence of things in time for attributes of things in themselves?the necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom. They are contradictory to each other?that means that at the time I act I am never free? (Pereboom, 102). Kant continues, that since morality presupposes freedom and since psychological determinism implies that humans are never free, psychological determinism implies that morality is empty and moral reactions are inappropriate. Kant?s argument, however, is unsuccessful because his assertions that transcendental freedom is necessary for morality and that morality becomes useless and inappropriate if psychological determinism is true are flawed.

Kant argues that psychological determinism rejects the existence of freedom since all action is subject to the law of necessity. Freedom, however, is not well defined. There is always limitation on any human action, so even with counter-causal freedom we would never be absolutely free. Assuming a man did have counter-causal freedom, he would still be subject to myriad physical limitations; he would not, for example, be able to choose to defy gravity. Absolute freedom, thus, is impossible for a human and the only freedom that can exist must be limited. The laws of necessity, although extremely limiting, are simply further restrictions placed upon that which is human freedom. Choices may be predetermined, their outcomes fixed according to antecedent conditions, but they still must be made for their outcomes to be reached. Therefore, the act of choosing, deliberating between options and settling on a course of action, in the present, regardless of what physical and psychological forces may have determined the outcome of the deliberation before it occurs, is the experience of human freedom.

Freedom as we know it requires us to shift our frame of reference to exclude these predetermining antecedent forces. We cannot and probably will not ever be able to calculate the effect every single force has upon a person?s choice and we will never view their choices from an omnipotent viewpoint; thus their choices will appear to be made freely. If we shift our perspective to include only that knowledge which we have, we can consider human action to be free. Kant refers to this sort of freedom as the ?free effect? or ?psychological freedom,? but why can?t this qualify as true freedom for all practical purposes? While absolute freedom is impossible to attain, the concept of limited freedom, even severely limited freedom, remains both possible and practical for viewing choices made in our frame of reference.
Kant asserts that morality relies on the existence of transcendental freedom. He writes, ?In this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will?from this point of view, a rational being can rightly say of any unlawful action that he has done that he could have left it undone, even if as an appearance it was sufficiently determined in the past and thus far was inescapably necessary? (Pereboom, 105). However, Kant?s assertion that morality presupposes transcendental freedom views morality from an omnipotent perspective. Morality ceases to be practical when one has perfect information, but since perfect information does not exist, morality does not require transcendental freedom.

Hume argues that benevolence is a natural human instinct, which cannot be reduced to more a more basic motivation, and that morality is based in benevolence. Thus morality can simply be seen as a concept, an inborn human construct, which serves to evaluate human action within the frame where freedom is possible. Morality is a practical tool for guiding action when freedom is assumed, regardless of whether or not actions are predetermined. This idea of morality as a natural human instinct then cannot be undermined by a lack of transcendental freedom; the instinct remains and its pragmatism is constant in a world governed by psychological determinism. Kant?s attempt to refute compatibilism thus rests on the false assumption that for morality to be valid, freedom must be transcendental.

One might object, asking: what about responsibility and punishment? How can people be held responsible or punished for actions predetermined by antecedent conditions?

Since, as I have stated, we will never know the forces which determine our fates and thus will never be able to predict with certainty the outcomes of our choices. With omnipotent knowledge, perhaps morality and freedom cease to exist, but as long as humans have imperfect knowledge, morality and the concept of freedom remain practical. Responsibility and punishment, too, are practical human constructs designed to deal with immoral actions. If an action is deemed immoral, the person who has committed the action is normally held responsible and punished. It is ridiculous on a pragmatic level to imagine holding the antecedent conditions of the universe responsible for any action ever performed. From the frame in which we view action, it is far more useful to be able to hold individual agents responsible for their own actions. Punishment, in its ideal form, was created with the purpose of creating an incentive system to reform behavior. In a world where psychological determinism holds true, punishment is effective because it alters the forces acting on people, hopefully thus altering their behavior. While the concept of responsibility and punishment may seem unfair when the universe is viewed from an omnipotent perspective, when viewed from the frame of reference in which we act, responsibility and punishment are fair and practical.

Acceptance of compatibilism requires a dualistic approach. Freedom can exist and morality can be considered appropriate when the universe is viewed from an imperfect perspective, but freedom, and thus the pragmatism of morality, ceases to exist when information is perfect. Since morality can continue to have practical application in a world absent of transcendental freedom, in which psychological determinism reigns, Kant?s argument does not successfully refute Hume?s concept of compatibilism.


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## Johnny Dep (Feb 8, 2009)

I'm convinced no one actually knows what Kant was trying to say. Its all a big act.


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## Conjurus (Oct 25, 2008)

I didn't read the post as I probably wouldn't understand it, but I read the title and I believe in the True will, which is half free will and half fate. Pretty buddhist concept I think- right in the middle.


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## EverDream (Dec 15, 2006)

I read only part of it but it made me remember an opinion about it that I learned once in school:
There is no contradiction between free will and fate. God knows what the person will choose to do and he doesn't interfere in it. This is considered to be fate. It doesn't make sense there won't be free will because then what's the point in everything we do and in responsibility and punishment (like you worte). Interesting.


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